Recommended documentary: The Fog of War

Robert S. McNamara served as US Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson from 1961 to 1968, administrations consumed by the Vietnam war. In The Fog of War he talks in hindsight of lessons that should be learned. Have we learned them?

There is no better time to revisit this American documentary than today, when our leaders seem to be under the impression that the US is so powerful that a little excursion here and a little killing there is all it takes to make America and the world safe again.

War has existed since time began, is likely to remain a part of human experience, and will always entail death and destruction. As such, war is possibly the most complex of human actions. There is no such thing in war as a “little excursion” to “get rid of some evil,” as President Donald Trump described the current US-Israel war on Iran.

Robert S. McNamara, Harvard-bred technocrat, original Whiz Kid from the Ford Motor Co., hand-picked by President John F. Kennedy as Secretary of Defense, talked about the complexity of war in the documentary The Fog of War – Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara. He made a credible point: we are human, make mistakes, often fail to fully understand the situation we are in, but must nevertheless make decisions on “how much evil must we do to do good?” And he offered the hope that we acknowledge these shortcomings and learn how to do better after each mistake.

By way of background, The Fog of War is a 2003 interview with then 85-year-old Robert McNamara, accompanied by archival footage and recordings of conversations from the 1960s. The film won the 2004 Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature, and in 2019, it was selected by the Library of Congress for preservation in the United States National Film Registry for being “culturally, historically, or aesthetically significant”. The film’s director was Errol Morris, and its original score was composed by American composer Philip Glass.

Director Morris divided the documentary into 11 sections representing his interpretation of what Robert McNamara was communicating in the interview. Morris labeled the sections “Lessons.”

The lessons of war from The Fog of War were the following:

Lesson #1: Empathize with your enemy.

McNamara makes clear that empathy is not sympathy, but understanding what your enemy really needs and acting accordingly. He gave an example.

After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, President Kennedy chose diplomacy instead of escalation. He promised Nikita Khrushchev the US would not invade Cuba and would establish a special “hot line” to Moscow. Khrushchev withdrew the Soviet missiles from Cuba, a nuclear war was avoided, and Khrushchev happily took credit for keeping the US from invading Cuba.

Lesson #2: Rationality alone will not save us.

Although Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Fidel Castro were presumably rational individuals, they came very close to annihilating themselves and possibly the world during the Cuban missile crisis. The complexity of rationality and the possibility of nuclear conflagration did not end with the Cuban crisis.

Lesson #3: There’s something beyond one’s self.

We are individuals first, but we are also social beings with responsibilities to others and to society. McNamara gives the example of how he discussed with his wife and 3 children the turmoil that would come into their lives and his significant decrease in income if he accepted the job of Secretary of Defense. He says it was a mutual agreement all around to accept the job.

Lesson #4: Maximize efficiency.

McNamara applied his analytical skills to bombing operations, and replaced the B-17s with B-29s, which promised to destroy targets more efficiently.

Lesson #5: Proportionality should be a guideline in war.

This section is possibly the most riveting in the documentary. McNamara explains the magnitude of destruction caused by US aircraft dropping napalm incendiary bombs in Tokyo – a prelude to Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Proportionality was not taken seriously, he says.

Lesson #6: Get the data.

Speaking like the Ford Whiz Kid he was, McNamara states that decisions must be made based on hard data.

Lesson #7: Belief and seeing are both often wrong.

“We see what we want to believe.” Thus, we “saw” North Vietnamese torpedo boats attack US ships, Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, and the US entered a war that lasted nearly 20 years and caused 47,000 combat deaths.

Lesson #8: Be prepared to reexamine your reasoning.

“if we can’t persuade nations with comparable values of the merit of our cause, we better reexamine our reasoning.” The US is powerful but must not use that power unilaterally – simply because it can.

Lesson #9: In order to do good, you may have to engage in evil.

McNamara saw killing for what it is – evil – but at times necessary. So, when avoidance is not viewed as possible, the next best option is minimizing.

Lesson #10: Never say never.

War is way too complex to feel smug about any judgment or prediction.

Lesson #11: You can’t change human nature.

In the fog of war things only become clear in hindsight.

Do these lessons still apply?

Yes, of course they do. But that is not to say anyone today is necessarily following those common sense guides, no more than these guides were followed in Robert McNamara’s time, or perhaps any time.

The complexity of war involves an infinite number of variables – those who benefit and those who suffer, those who decide how many is OK to let die and those who want to “make love not war,” those who want to believe causes are just and those who feed the narratives, those who refer to war as little excursions and those who return home in body bags.

The complexity of war extends not only to things readily seen, but also to things often unforeseen. Was the widespread destruction of Middle East assets following the February 28, 2026, US/Israel attack on Iran anticipated? Did American families foresee price increases at the grocery store due to Iranian disruption of petroleum supplies affecting production of fertilizers?

Here is a quote from 19th century French economist Frédéric Bastiat that should place doubt on statements like “The United States is the largest Oil Producer in the World, by far, so when oil prices go up, we make a lot of money.” (Post on X White House 03/12/26).

“In the department of economy, an act, a habit, an institution, a law, gives birth not only to an effect, but to a series of effects. Of these effects, the first only is immediate; it manifests itself simultaneously with its cause — it is seen. The others unfold in succession — they are not seen: it is well for us, if they are foreseen. ” (That Which is Seen, and That Which is Not Seen, July 1850)

Robert S. McNamara would agree with Frédéric Bastiat. In life, in war, in economics, it is better to acknowledge complexity and try to foresee consequences of actions, whether those actions are viewed as necessary or not.

Remembering September 11

It is good to remember and honor lives lost in tragic events. It is good to reflect on the events that 9/11 unleashed to establish our “post 9/11 world.”

ribbonIt’s good to remember and honor innocent lives lost in tragic events. On September 11, 2001, 2976 men, women, and children from all walks of life died at the hand of 19 suicide hijackers in New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia.

It is not good to say their death were not unique, since innocent civilians are routinely massacred during times of conflict. It is not good to dismiss this tragedy as the work of some hidden nefarious entity.

It is best to honor these lost lives by reflecting on the utter uselessness and evil of endless conflict and war.

Our reflection on this calamity should include the events the attack on these lives unleashed. It should include our assessment is the “post-9/11” world leaders created, and citizens demanded in the name of “security.”

A measure of conflict is unavoidable in any group, be it parents and children or the family of nations. However, any group regardless of size, location, ethnicity or religion could reflect on the uselessness of oppression, thirst for power, and myopic battles.

May the souls lost on September 11 be resting in peace. May we the living work towards an end to conflicts that inevitably result in slaughter of the innocent.

John Bolton is Gone: Why Was He Ever Chosen?

Today, Donald Trump fired John Bolton. One might ask why Trump, a self-described deal maker, chose a quintessential foreign policy hawk in the first place.

BoltonOn September 10, 2019, President Donald Trump accepted the resignation of John Bolton, the National Security Advisor he chose in April of 2018.

Bolton is the quintessential foreign policy hawk, who believes forceful action — what some call regime change — should be the preferred option in dealing with nations the U.S.  perceives as threats.

The question could enter people’s mind as to why a President who saw himself as an accomplished deal maker and campaigned on the promise of ending U.S. endless wars would choose an advisor like Bolton. Perhaps the answer is that John Bolton’s purported aim is the same as Donald Trump’s: advocate for American interests.

But, unfortunately, no matter how sincere is Bolton’s aim, Trump must have finally faced the fact that the devil is in the details, and Bolton’s strategy has never included deal making or ending war in the maintenance of regime change.

As noted in a comprehensive article in The Atlantic, in his memoir Surrender is Not an Option John Bolton expresses contempt for what he views as soft foreign policy.

State careerists are schooled in accommodation and compromise with foreigners, rather than aggressive advocacy of U.S. interests, which might inconveniently disrupt the serenity of diplomatic exchanges, not to mention dinner parties and receptions.

The problem that Trump possibly had to face in Bolton’s case is that in government, just as in business, something either works as advertised or it does not. True, the bigger the entity, the more freely it can paper over discrepancies between what is said and what is done.

However, the failures of regime changes are becoming simply too obvious to hide: Guatemala, Chile, Iran, Zaire, Afghanistan, Iraq.  The autocrats that took over these nations after the U.S. intervened left them no better than before intervention.

There is a saying, “War is the health of the state.” Hawks like John Bolton probably sincerely believe that. However, Thomas Jefferson might have had a better idea,

Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations – entangling alliances with none.  Thomas Jefferson, Inaugural Address.

Venezuela, The Neocons are Back!

Neocons are the liberal internationalists who endeavored to impose U.S. ideals where they saw such ideals lacking. They are the remnants of the Cold War. They are the revolutionaries of the 1960s who became disenchanted with what the liberalism of the day came to mean: hippies and the anti-war protests.

Yes, the neocons are back, and as matter of fact they were never far away from power through think-tanks like the Council on Foreign Relations or the Heritage Foundation. Monthly Review Online, 02/19/19.

Elliott Abrams 2Elliott Abrams, a controversial neoconservative figure who was entangled in the Iran-Contra affair, has been named as a Trump administration special envoy overseeing policy toward Venezuela, which has been rocked by a leadership crisis.  Politico, 01/25/19.

The United States has a clear objective in Venezuela: regime change and the restoration of democracy and the rule of law. Yet sanctions, international diplomatic isolation, and internal pressure have failed to deliver a breakthrough. Minds are turning to military intervention. U.S. President Donald Trump has said that “all options are on the table.  Foreign Affairs, 03/19/19.

Iterations of Interventionists

Neoconservatives, or neocons, are the hawkish rightwing in the political spectrum. They are fond of regime change, spreading democracy, defending our interest abroad, and protecting oil.

This is not to say that U.S. interventionism or empire building started with the rise of the neocons in the 1960s. Far from it. Neocons just took over where previous iterations of interventionists left off.

Neocons are the liberal internationalists who endeavored to impose U.S. ideals where they saw such ideals lacking. They are the remnants of the Cold War. They are the revolutionaries of the 1960s who became disenchanted with what the liberalism of the day came to mean: hippies and the anti-war protests. Eventually they migrated to a solid hawkish camp and embraced regime change in whatever form.

Certainly there are those who wish to make fine distinctions between iterations of interventionists. But black ops, development aid, building civil society, hard power, and military force all aim toward the same objective – takeover of a sovereign nation.

The U.S., of course, is not alone in its quest for hegemony. Cultural, economic, and military conquest has existed since the beginning of time. Today, as always, superpowers vie with one another as to who can dominate the most people. But here we focus on Venezuela and the U.S. track record in Latin America. Will U.S. taxpayers be once again on the hook for another questionably imperative neocon adventure?

U.S. Intervention in Latin America

Before the Middle East was all the news, there was Latin America. Now, after Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Syria, the U.S. is pivoting towards Venezuela. A look at the U.S. track record in Latin America since the 1960s would give us a rough idea of how useful an intervention in Venezuela would be.

* Fidel Castro’s economic and military alliance with the Soviet Union displeased President John F. Kennedy. In 1961 the U.S. backed an invasion of Cuba intended to overthrow Castro. The “Bay of Pigs Invasion” failed and Castro continued in power.

* When President of Brazil Janio Quadros resigned in 1961 after seven months in office, his vice president Joao Goulart assumed the presidency over the objections of the military, who feared Goulart’s left-leaning tendencies. In 1964 Goulart was overthrown in a U.S.-backed coup, which installed a military authoritarian government that lasted until the 1980s.

* Before and after the election of Marxist President Salvador Allende of Chile, the CIA worked diligently first to prevent Allende from getting elected and then to promote a coup to remove him from office. The CIA succeeded when in 1973 troops led by General Augusto Pinochet overthrew Allende. Pinochet ruled as president of a repressive authoritarian state for the next 17 years.

* In 1979 left-leaning Sandinistas took power in Nicaragua, and were not interested in U.S. influence. The Ronald Reagan administration mounted a covert operation whereby the U.S. would sell arms to Iran, so Iran could continue its war with Iraq, and the money generated from the arms sale would finance the Contras opposition to the Sandinistas. The Sandinistas remained in power for the next decade, while the Regan administration suffered accusations of illegal foreign operations.

* Manuel Noriega was a long-standing CIA informer who became President of Panama. In 1989, the U.S. invaded Panama and arrested Noriega. U.S. President George H.W. Bush cited the need to safeguard the lives of U.S. citizens living in Panama, defend democracy and human rights, combat drug trafficking, and protect the integrity of the Panama Canal Treaties. This incident marked the first time the U.S. arrested, tried and convicted the leader of a sovereign nation.

* Haiti’s duly elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was deposed in 1991 by a military coup headed by Lieutenant-General Raoul Cédras. Aristide appealed to the Organization of American States and the United Nation’s Security Council. After many attempts at negotiation with Cedras, in 1994 the U.N. Security Council authorized member states to form a multinational force to use all necessary means to restore Aristide to his post as President of Haiti. A U.S.-led invasion of Haiti did just that. In 2004, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was deposed again. U.N. Missions are still in Haiti.

* Starting in the 1890s U.S.-based banana companies established vast plantations in Honduras, transforming the country into the quintessential Banana Republic. Militarization as a result of the U.S. using Honduras as a base to fight the Nicaraguan Sandinistas added to the country’s problems. In 2005 left-leaning Manuel Zelaya was elected President of Honduras. He attempted liberal reforms and relations with Cuba, and was overthrown by a military coup in 2009, in which the U.S. remained tacit. Today, the dire situation in Honduras contributes to thousands of asylum seekers to flood U.S. borders.

It’s not surprising then that the rising and pervasive violence and deep economic insecurity in Honduras and the region has resulted in unprecedented numbers of refugees and migrants fleeing to seek safety and security. The awful irony is that many must seek that shelter in a country that has in no small part contributed over the course of decades to the rapidly deteriorating conditions from which they are fleeing – and that is overtly unwelcoming and hostile.  Eight Years After the Coup in Honduras The Struggle Continues, Center for Constitutional Rights, 06/28/17

So, Does Intervention Work?

From the U.S. track record in Latin America (and the Middle East), one might question the long term effects of military intervention. Thousands suffered at the hands of right-wing autocrats like Augusto Pinochet because such leaders were deemed by the U.S. preferable to left-leaning reformers. Thousands suffer today in Haiti, Honduras, and Venezuela. Relatively stable nations like Brazil and Panama are plagued by extreme inequalities of opportunity.

Maybe the Donald Trump Administration should engage in a reality check before intervening in Venezuela.